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ABSTRACT. This study investigates the economic value added (EVA) of 18 major Chinese property 
companies from 2006 to 2012. We categorize the companies in two ways: 1) companies concentrating 
on property vs multi-functional companies and 2) state-owned enterprises (SOEs) vs privately-owned 
enterprises (POEs). We find that on average, the mainland property companies experienced a negative 
EVA during the period 2006–2012. This is due to the companies undertaking long-term projects, and 
the companies do not recognize capital gain from property appreciation as income. Hence the EVA of 
the companies is, in fact, understated. The results also reveal that POEs outperform SOEs in terms of 
EVA. This reflects the inefficiency of SOEs. This research has two important implications to investors. 
Firstly, besides looking at the EVA of the companies, investors should also understand the nature of 
businesses of the companies thoroughly. Secondly, investors investing in emerging markets like China 
should have a thorough understanding of their market characteristics. This study can act as a reference 
for future studies in EVA of property companies in other emerging economies in the world.
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1. INTRODUCTION
China’s economy has been undergoing tremendous 
transformation and rapid growth since its economic 
reform in late 1970s. With over 8% GDP growth rate 
on average1, it surpassed Japan and became the sec-
ond largest economy in the world just behind the 
U.S. in 2010. In particular, real estate has become 
one of the fastest growing areas since the Housing 
Policy Reform in 1998. Due to favorable policies to-
wards the property sector and swift growth of the 
domestic economy in the new century, the commod-
ity property market has been thriving in terms of 
both building area and market capital since 2001. 
The commencing area surged from around 400 mil-
lion m2 in 2001 to over 1.6 billion m2 in 2010 (Fig. 1). 
At the meantime, the total investment involving in 
property development increased by almost 8 times 
from 634 billion yuan to 4,826 billion yuan (Fig. 2). 
Therefore, investigating the performance 
1 International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/)
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of real estate developers in a proper way and iden-
tifying the booster behind are of extraordinary 
significance for investors to recognize investment 
opportunities.
Ooi and Liow (2002) and Hui et al. (2007) evalu-
ated the economic performance of real estate de-
velopers in Singapore and Hong Kong respective-
ly. Both articles adopted Economic Value Added 
(EVA) which has been advocated by numerous 
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Fig. 1. Commodity property construction  
commenced (2001–2010)
Source: national Bureau of Statistics of China
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Fig. 2. Investment in commodity property (2001–2010)
Source: national Bureau of Statistics of China
numbers of scholars and corporate governors as an 
effective way to evaluate companies’ performance 
since its invention in 1989. This paper examines 
EVA of property companies in China, of which 
only a few studies investigated on. unlike Hong 
Kong, China is still a planned economy. Although 
the Chinese government has continued to open up 
its market since the open-door policy was imple-
mented in 1978, the government remains certain 
control over the market. Therefore, Chinese com-
panies may have different EVA from those com-
panies operating in market economies like Hong 
Kong. In particular, many Chinese enterprises are 
still owned by the government. These state-owned 
enterprises’ (SOEs’) EVA may be different from 
those privately-owned enterprises’ (POEs’). This 
study aims to fill in this gap.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives 
a literature review of previous studies on EVA. 
Section 3 gives a brief description of EVA and 
other performance measurement tools. Section 4 
describes the data source. Section 5 presents the 
results. Section 6 further explains the implication 
of the results. Finally, a conclusion is drawn in 
Section 7.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
According to modern corporate finance theory, the 
ultimate goal of a company is to maximize share-
holders’ profit. Economic value added (EVA) is 
identified as an effective measure to assess corpo-
rate performance.
The definition of EVA was not renowned and 
well-adopted as it is nowadays when first proposed 
by Finegan in 1989 (Chen, Dodd 1997). However, 
an article in Fortune magazine called “The Real 
Key to Creating Wealth” by Tully (1993) made it 
in the spotlight. The article strongly praised EVA 
as the most exciting innovation in gauging corpo-
rate success. The possible adoption of EVA started 
to attract the attention of management in inter-
national corporations. Proponents of EVA at that 
time include Coca-Cola, CSX, Compaq Computer, 
and so on. Through over 20 years of development, 
discussion and verification, the idea of EVA is now 
considered to be one of the important selection cri-
teria for investors and managers to measure corpo-
rations’ economic performance all over the world. 
Besides foreign conglomerates, the metric has been 
adopted by domestic property developers such as 
Vanke and Gemdale to enhance capital utilization 
and stock performance.
There are a number of studies on EVA in the 
past. For example, Chen and Dodd (1997) exam-
ine the EVA of 566 u.S. companies and compare 
the information usefulness of EVA with accounting 
earnings and residual income. They find that EVA 
is more powerful than traditional measures of ac-
counting profit in explaining stock return. Moreo-
ver, not only is EVA similar to residual income 
in concept, but also the two metrics are empiri-
cally comparable. Ooi and Liow (2002) track the 
performance of Singapore property companies, 
and claim that their actual performance is under-
stated in terms of EVA. Hui et al. (2007) replicate 
the above study for Hong Kong property market. 
They find that the multi-functional groups gener-
ally outperformed those with sole business focus 
on real estate development and management. Liow 
and Ooi (2004) examine the influence of corporate 
real estate (CRE) on shareholder value using EVA 
and market value added (MVA). They find that if a 
firm has a higher the real estate asset intensity, it 
will have lower EVA and MVA. In addition, there 
are also other studies on EVA (e.g. Milunovich, 
Tsuei 1996; Anctil et al. 1998; O’Hanlon, Peasnell 
1998; Demodaran 1999; Biddle et al. 1997; Peas-
nell 1982).
There are only a few studies on performance 
measure of China’s real estate companies. Zheng 
et al. (2010) measure the performance and efficien-
cy of 94 Listed Real Estate Companies (LRECs) 
in Mainland China by three types of Data Envel-
opment Analysis (DEA), namely CCR-DEA, BCC-
DEA and Super-Efficiency-DEA models. They find 
out that 69% of the inefficient LRECs in China are 
dominated by increasing returns to scale, which 
implies that these companies can further increase 
their operating efficiency through expansion. Ke 
(2008) investigates the state-owned property de-
velopers in China using annual stock returns (SR) 
as the market performance indicator, the natural 
logarithm return on equity (ROE (Ln)) as the ac-
counting performance indicator, and the ratio of 
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selling, general and administration costs to sales 
(SG&A to sale) as operating efficiency indicators. 
He finds no evidence that the operation of state-
owned developers is inefficient. The performance of 
private developers in China, however, is not meas-
ured in a quantitative means.
According to Sharma and Kumar (2010), out of 
the total of 112 articles on EVA, the country with 
the largest number of articles studying on was 
USA, with a number of 51 articles (or 45% of total) 
studying on this country. India ranked the second 
with 21 articles (or 19% of total) studying on it. In 
contrary, only two articles studied EVA of compa-
nies in China (see Table 1): Liao and Feng (2005) 
and Chen and Qiao (2008). However, both articles 
are just empirical studies on EVA of Chinese com-
panies in general, without focusing on a particular 
field of business. Moreover, they do not capture the 
most recent information. On the other hand, our 
study investigates the EVA of mainland property 
companies from 2006 to 2012. In particular, we di-
vide the companies into two classes, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and privately-owned enter-
prises (POEs). SOEs are owned by the government 
and exist only in planned economies like China. 
They may behave differently from POEs in terms 
of EVA. Hence our study can bridge the gap.
Besides, Sharma and Kumar (2010) also found 
that a large proportion of the previous studies in-
vestigated the adoption of EVA in the manufac-
turing industry, and to some extent overlooked 
the application in other fields like the real estate 
industry. Thus, they appealed that using EVA ap-
proach to measure the performance of non-manu-
facturing industries in emerging counties may be 
another area for future research.
Table 1. Country-wise publication of studies on EVA 
(Sharma, Kumar 2010)
S. no. Country no. of studies conducted
1 uSA 51
2 India 21





Note: * Other includes Malaysia, Canada, Brazil, Greece, 
Russia, New Zealand, Kuwait, Turkey, Indonesia, etc.
From the above literature review, it is noted 
that although performance of property firms in de-
veloped Asian economies such as Hong Kong and 
Singapore has been well discussed by scholars, 
there are still no publications on performance of 
real estate companies in China in terms of EVA. 
In order to fill in this gap, this study examines 
EVA of major mainland property companies from 
2006 to 2012.
3. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT TOOLS
3.1. Traditional measures
Traditionally, the following measures are com-
monly used to evaluate the performance of a firm:
 – Accounting profit;
 – Earnings per share (EPS) = Net profit/Total 
number of shares;
 – Return on equity (ROE) = Net profit/Equity 
(or any other accounting rate of return like 
return on investment (ROI), return on asset 
(ROA), etc.).
The above measures indicate a firm’s profitabil-
ity. However, according to Ooi and Liow (2002), 
higher accounting profit does not necessarily mean 
that deployment of capital is more efficient. Since 
no cost is imputed for the use of equity capital, the 
real cost of business is understated. This may lead 
to an illusion of cheap equity capital. Moreover, the 
policy of maximizing ROI (or ROE) does not always 
encourage managers to make decisions aligned 
with the goals of the company (Brewer et al. 1999; 
Ooi, Liow 2002). Ooi and Liow (2002) raised the fol-
lowing example: if financial compensation is linked 
to ROI or ROE, a manager has no incentive to pur-
sue investments yielding positive returns, but at a 
lower rate than what is currently achieved due to 
potential earnings dilution. Instead, projects with 
high returns potential may be favored at the ex-
pense of exposing the company to unduly high risk. 
This disadvantage leads to the invention of EVA, 
which can reflect shareholders’ value more truly.
3.2. EVA
EVA, registered by Stern Stewart & Co, is used in 
this study to measure the economic profit of real es-
tate companies. Unlike other traditional financial 
performance indicators like ROI/ROE/EPS, EVA 
measures the residual wealth by deducting cost 
of capital from net operating profit. The rationale 
behind this is that only when the profit generating 
from the company’s total capital invested exceeds 
the cost of capital employed can shareholders’ val-
ue be created. Otherwise, the company is deemed 
to have destroyed shareholders’ value. In view of 
corporate finance, the former can be represented 
by net operating profit after tax (NOPAT), while 
the later can be represented by weighted average 
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cost of capital (WACC) multiplied by the total capi-
tal invested (IC). The advantage of EVA is that it 
helps the management and employees to under-
stand the real cost of equity capital, and hence 
lowers the chance that management misuses free 
cash flow in unprofitable investments (Makelainen 
1998; Ooi, Liow 2002). Since EVA adopts the re-
sidual income approach, it is consistent with the 
general rule of accepting a project with positive 
nPV. A further advantage raised by Ooi and Liow 
(2002) is that when compensation is linked with 
EVA, the goals of employees, managers the entire 
company are tied together, reducing the conflict of 
interests between the management and sharehold-
ers (Wallace 1997), i.e. the agency problem.
The most commonly adopted formula for EVA 
calculation is (also adopted in this paper):
EVA = NOPAT–WACC*IC = (ROIC–WACC)*IC, (1)
where: NOPAT – net operating profit after tax; 
WACC – weighted average cost of capital; IC – to-
tal invested capital; ROIC = nOPAT/IC – return 
on capital invested.
note that nOPAT is used to measure a compa-
ny’s operating profit deducting tax for stockholders 
and debt holders. ROIC is used to estimate how 
well a company generates profit compared with 
the total capital invested in the business. A higher 
ROIC usually indicates higher profitability. Mean-
while, WACC denotes the ratio that a company is 
paid to its debt and equity holders to fund its total 
capital. It also suggests the minimum return rate 
the company is required to earn for the purpose of 
satisfying all the security holders. An increase in 
WACC for a company denotes a decrease in valu-
ation and a higher risk.
EVA can act as an indicator of a company’s 
economic profit. Positive EVA means that the 
value created by operating activities exceeds the 
required rate of return by the company’s investors, 
and vice versa. When EVA is used to measure a 
company’s real profitability, the increase in EVA 
means that the company is able to boost operating 
profits in spite of involving more capital; to invest 
in developments which generate more than the 
cost of investment; or to involve less investment 
for the identical level of business.
4. DATA SOURCE
We select property companies in Mainland China 
according to the following criteria:
(a) The companies rank among top 50 of the 
largest real estate companies in Mainland 
China.
(b) During the period 2006–2012, not less than 
50% of revenue of the companies came from 
real estate, and the core property businesses 
of all the companies are in Mainland China.
(c) The companies were listed on the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (SZSE), Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) or Hong Kong Stock Ex-
change (HKSE) no later than 2006.
Table 2. The 18 selected mainland property companies




Scope of business Ownership
Concentration Diversification SOE POE
China Overseas Land & Investment Ltd. 00688 Hong Kong X X
Greentown China Holdings Ltd. 03900 Hong Kong X X
Hopson Development Holdings Ltd. 00754 Hong Kong X X
Guangzhou R&F Properties Co Ltd. 02777 Hong Kong X X
China Resources Land Ltd. 01109 Hong Kong X X
Shenzhen Investment Ltd. 00604 Hong Kong X X
SRE Group Ltd. 01207 Hong Kong X X
Shenzhen Overseas Chinese Town Co Ltd. 000069 Shenzhen X X
Suning universal Co Ltd. 000718 Shenzhen X X
Financial Street Holdings Co Ltd. 000402 Shenzhen X X
China Merchants Property Development Co Ltd. 000024 Shenzhen X X
yinyi Real Estate Co Ltd. 000981 Shenzhen X X
Hubei Fuxing Science And Technology Co Ltd. 000926 Shenzhen X X
Gemdale Corporation 600383 Shanghai X X
Beijing Capital Development Co Ltd. 600376 Shanghai X X
Tianjin Reality Development Group Co Ltd. 600322 Shanghai X X
Xiamen C & D Inc. 600153 Shanghai X X
Jiangsu Future Land Co Ltd. 900950 Shanghai X X
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(d) The year-end date of the companies is 31 De-
cember.
After selecting the companies, we obtain the 
following fields of data of those companies each 
year during the period 2006–2012 from Bloomberg:
(i) ROIC (Bloomberg code: WACC_RETuRn_
ON_INV_CAPITAL),
(ii) WACC (Bloomberg code: WACC),
(iii) ROIC – WACC (Bloomberg code: WACC_
EVA_SPREAD),
(iv) EVA (Bloomberg code: WACC_ECOn_VAL-
uE_ADDED) (all the values are converted 
to RMB).
A total of only 18 companies are chosen because 
they are the only companies which fulfill all the 
three criteria (a) to (d), and their fields of data 
(i) to (iv) from 2006 to 2012 can be obtained from 
Bloomberg.
We classify the 18 selected companies by the 
following two ways:
1. Companies concentrating their business 
solely on property development, building 
construction, leasing, property management, 
hotel investment, etc. (“Concentration”) vs 
Companies with a primary focus on property, 
but also expose to other sectors of business 
(“Diversification”).
2. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) vs Privately-
owned enterprises (POEs).
Table 2 shows the 18 selected companies and 
their classification by the above two ways.
5. RESULTS AND FINDINGS
Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 display the EVA, ROIC, WACC, 
ROIC-WACC of the 18 selected mainland property 
companies during the period 2006–2012 respective-
ly. From Table 3, we can see that except for Jiangsu 
Future Land Co Ltd., all other 17 companies record-
ed a negative average EVA during the period. In 
each of the year during the period, the average EVA 
of the 18 companies is negative. The magnitude of 
negativity of the average EVA was not so great in 
2006 and 2007, but since 2008, the average EVA of 
the 18 companies has stayed below RMB –600 mil-
lion, and even plunged to a trough of about RMB 
–1400 million in 2011. It seems that the companies 
did not perform so well in terms of EVA during the 
period. To look deeper into the real picture, we con-
sider the ROIC, WACC, and the gap between ROIC 
and WACC of the 18 companies during the period.
Table 4 shows the ROIC of the 18 companies 
during the period. From the table, although the 
ROIC of different companies varied during the 
period, the average ROIC of the 18 companies re-
mained rather stable during the period, except for 
year 2008, when the average ROIC of the compa-
nies fell to a minimum of 1.50%, mainly due to 
the effect of the global financial tsunami in that 
year which significantly hurt the profitability of 
many companies worldwide. For the other years in 
the period, the average ROIC of the companies re-
mained within a stable range from 5.23% to 6.51%.
Table 3. EVA of the 18 mainland property companies during the period 2006–2012 (unit: million RMB)
Stock code 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
00688 –414.56 –1274.08 –408.98 742.12 4018.95 –5224.42 –1737.46 –614.06
03900 927.14 –221.36 –583.96 –2224.24 –2127.06 119.49 86.04 –574.85
00754 304.24 3074.22 –2160.34 –1217.73 –1585.48 –2856.53 –4660.83 –1300.35
02777 827.71 30.08 63.48 –1924.89 –17.67 –709.28 673.99 –150.94
01109 –1980.19 –4376.74 –3859.31 –3309.83 –689.09 –4458.90 –4313.59 –3283.95
00604 –695.10 –1551.22 –358.42 –1165.25 –856.01 –791.82 –702.44 –874.32
01207 73.05 –501.19 207.37 –574.08 –252.93 –49.19 –368.55 –209.36
000069 –212.41 –657.17 –532.62 –110.51 –656.54 –2263.77 –2137.37 –938.63
000718 21.32 –64.15 229.07 129.07 –238.32 –442.28 –479.81 –120.73
000402 –41.38 388.31 –1390.82 –2556.45 –2068.89 –1958.22 –1426.54 –1293.43
000024 –775.84 –636.38 –2019.37 –1800.66 –1330.16 –1091.44 –806.23 –1208.58
000981 –73.12 –158.64 –236.83 –85.44 7.84 –153.15 –219.93 –131.32
000926 0.06 60.13 –97.51 –441.25 –929.79 –772.91 –656.20 –405.35
600383 –208.37 –596.86 –531.81 –1926.64 –1890.36 –1510.13 –1432.08 –1156.61
600376 –654.01 200.73 –253.60 –2049.38 –2290.14 –2096.78 –2342.89 –1355.15
600322 –197.27 –89.79 –439.18 –712.81 –571.59 –467.08 –529.02 –429.53
600153 –46.64 –170.09 167.34 –399.19 –111.54 –642.12 –413.75 –230.86
900950 165.61 194.65 168.21 13.11 –99.77 63.95 303.96 115.67
Average –165.54 –352.75 –668.74 –1089.67 –649.36 –1405.81 –1175.71 –786.80
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Table 4. ROIC of the 18 mainland property companies during the period 2006–2012
Stock code 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
00688 8.34% 9.39% 6.94% 10.42% 12.82% 6.43% 10.20% 9.22%
03900 11.15% 3.58% 1.58% 1.88% 2.45% 5.16% 10.31% 5.16%
00754 10.23% 18.43% –0.86% 5.63% 5.72% 1.74% 1.39% 6.04%
02777 11.44% 11.79% 7.02% 4.65% 9.05% 7.19% 9.39% 8.65%
01109 2.66% 3.93% 3.52% 5.45% 6.95% 5.81% 7.05% 5.05%
00604 3.28% 1.05% 2.65% 2.83% 4.15% 3.09% 4.35% 3.06%
01207 10.26% 5.42% 5.08% 2.94% 3.96% 2.47% 0.59% 4.39%
000069 4.03% 1.86% 6.61% 12.35% 9.38% 7.12% 7.17% 6.93%
000718 8.86% 8.27% 18.50% 17.04% 11.57% 9.35% 8.56% 11.74%
000402 7.34% 10.27% 3.35% 2.55% 3.91% 4.01% 4.79% 5.17%
000024 –0.30% 5.36% 1.30% 5.02% 6.88% 5.93% 8.32% 4.64%
000981 –6.27% –24.30% –64.53% –7.74% 5.70% 9.02% 6.48% –11.66%
000926 7.33% 7.67% 6.42% 5.51% 3.72% 4.19% 5.11% 5.71%
600383 5.23% 7.57% 4.82% 5.82% 6.72% 6.33% 7.21% 6.24%
600376 –0.79% 4.65% 4.36% 2.68% 3.46% 4.29% 3.34% 3.14%
600322 1.00% 1.37% 1.95% 1.35% 1.85% 5.05% 4.08% 2.38%
600153 6.38% 6.16% 8.40% 6.76% 7.62% 6.89% 7.22% 7.06%
900950 12.89% 11.71% 9.88% 9.95% 7.04% 8.60% 11.56% 10.23%
Average 5.72% 5.23% 1.50% 5.28% 6.28% 5.70% 6.51% 5.18%
Table 5. WACC of the 18 mainland companies during the period 2006–2012
Stock code 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
00688 10.03% 12.51% 7.69% 9.18% 8.49% 11.98% 11.64% 10.22%
03900 3.88% 4.60% 3.51% 7.69% 6.65% 4.97% 10.14% 5.92%
00754 8.44% 10.06% 4.74% 8.29% 8.35% 5.78% 7.83% 7.64%
02777 6.57% 11.70% 6.86% 9.09% 9.09% 8.56% 8.34% 8.60%
01109 11.50% 15.39% 11.57% 10.91% 7.84% 9.92% 10.98% 11.16%
00604 7.72% 8.85% 4.30% 8.09% 4.15% 5.90% 6.35% 6.48%
01207 9.18% 9.56% 3.60% 5.96% 5.09% 2.67% 2.55% 5.52%
000069 7.38% 8.04% 9.03% 12.96% 11.38% 12.27% 11.88% 10.42%
000718 6.58% 10.76% 11.59% 14.40% 14.62% 14.33% 13.73% 12.29%
000402 7.93% 6.92% 9.15% 10.06% 9.18% 8.81% 7.66% 8.53%
000024 7.73% 8.72% 8.35% 11.77% 10.79% 8.32% 9.86% 9.36%
000981 6.42% 5.24% 8.61% 13.23% 5.55% 11.06% 8.52% 8.38%
000926 7.33% 6.53% 7.93% 11.08% 11.03% 9.28% 9.51% 8.95%
600383 8.07% 10.97% 7.13% 11.50% 10.93% 9.07% 9.53% 9.60%
600376 3.96% 3.25% 6.22% 11.57% 11.43% 9.89% 8.71% 7.86%
600322 6.36% 2.74% 7.28% 10.77% 10.70% 11.65% 10.33% 8.55%
600153 7.13% 7.96% 7.34% 8.83% 8.04% 8.76% 8.28% 8.05%
900950 6.04% 6.79% 6.22% 9.69% 8.11% 8.06% 9.02% 7.70%
Average 7.35% 8.37% 7.28% 10.28% 8.97% 8.96% 9.16% 8.62%
Table 5 shows the WACC of the 18 companies dur-
ing the period. From the table, the average WACC 
of the 18 companies remained between 7.28% and 
8.37% from 2006 to 2008. In 2009, the companies’ 
average WACC reached a maximum of 10.28%. The 
average WACC of the companies remained around 
9% in the following three years, which is higher than 
the level in 2006–2008. As explained in Section 3, an 
increase in WACC indicated higher risk. The higher 
level of WACC of the companies since 2009 indicated 
a higher level of risk of the companies since then. 
This may be due to the global financial tsunami in 
late 2008 which increased the risk of most compa-
nies. This is reflected by the higher level of WACC of 
the companies since 2009. This effect persisted until 
2012 as the Euro crisis, an aftershock of the global 
financial tsunami, broke out in 2010, keeping the 
companies at high risk.
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Comparing the results in Tables 4 and 5, for 
each year in the period 2006–2012, the average 
ROIC of the 18 companies is lower than their aver-
age WACC. Therefore, from Table 6, which shows 
the gap between ROIC and WACC of the 18 com-
panies during the period 2006–2012, we can see 
that the average value of ROIC – WACC of the 
companies remained negative throughout the pe-
riod. Hence by formula (1), the average EVA of the 
companies also remained negative throughout the 
period. The average value of ROIC – WACC bot-
tomed at –5.78% in 2008 and rebounded to –3.26% 
to –2.65% in 2010–2012, but the average EVA fell 
to a trough of about RMB – 1400 million in 2011, 
and remained low at nearly RMB –1200 in 2012. 
During the period 2006–2012, the decrease in 
EVA is much greater than the decrease in ROIC – 
WACC. From formula (1), this reveals that the 
total invested capital (IC) of the companies has 
increased over the period, i.e. the companies were 
in a stage of expansion over the period. When RO-
IC-WACC is negative, a higher level of IC would 
make the value of EVA even more negative.
From Table 7, during the period 2006–2012, 
multifunctional companies have a higher EVA 
than those concentrating on real estate. According 
to Hui et al. (2007), when a company diversifies its 
investment, part of its revenue can be generated 
and received earlier from other business ventures 
due to their relatively shorter-term nature, caus-
ing better economic performance. Hui et al. (2007) 
found that Hong Kong property companies diver-
sifying into other sectors appeared to outperform 
those focused solely in real estate. Liow and Ooi 
(2004) also showed that a higher intensity of real 
estate assets of a company would lead to a lower 
EVA.
As shown in Table 8, during the period 2006–
2012, POEs enjoyed a higher ROIC and a lower 
WACC than SOEs. Hence they experienced a 
Table 6. ROIC – WACC of the 18 mainland companies during the period 2006–2012
Stock code 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
00688 –1.70% –3.12% –0.75% 1.25% 4.33% –5.55% –1.44% –1.00%
03900 7.26% –1.02% –1.94% –5.82% –4.20% 0.18% 0.17% –0.77%
00754 1.79% 8.37% –5.60% –2.66% –2.63% –4.04% –6.44% –1.60%
02777 4.87% 0.09% 0.17% –4.44% –0.04% –1.37% 1.06% 0.05%
01109 –8.85% –11.46% –8.05% –5.45% –0.89% –4.10% –3.94% –6.11%
00604 –4.44% –7.80% –1.65% –5.26% 0.00% –2.81% –2.00% –3.42%
01207 1.09% –4.14% 1.48% –3.02% –1.13% –0.20% –1.96% –1.13%
000069 –3.35% –6.18% –2.42% –0.61% –1.99% –5.15% –4.71% –3.49%
000718 2.28% –2.49% 6.92% 2.64% –3.05% –4.98% –5.17% –0.55%
000402 –0.59% 3.35% –5.80% –7.51% –5.28% –4.80% –2.87% –3.36%
000024 –8.03% –3.37% –7.06% –6.75% –3.91% –2.39% –1.54% –4.72%
000981 –12.69% –29.54% –73.14% –20.97% 0.15% –2.05% –2.05% –20.04%
000926 0.00% 1.15% –1.51% –5.57% –7.31% –5.09% –4.41% –3.25%
600383 –2.84% –3.40% –2.31% –5.68% –4.20% –2.74% –2.32% –3.36%
600376 –4.75% 1.41% –1.86% –8.89% –7.97% –5.60% –5.37% –4.72%
600322 –5.36% –1.37% –5.32% –9.42% –8.85% –6.61% –6.25% –6.17%
600153 –0.75% –1.79% 1.07% –2.07% –0.42% –1.86% –1.06% –0.98%
900950 6.84% 4.92% 3.66% 0.26% –1.07% 0.54% 2.54% 2.53%
Average –1.62% –3.13% –5.78% –5.00% –2.69% –3.26% –2.65% –3.45%
Table 7. Average POIC, WACC, ROIC – WACC and EVA of property-concentrated and multi-functional companies 
during the period 2006–2012
ROIC WACC ROIC-WACC EVA (million RMB)
Concentration 4.46% 8.38% –3.92% –858.25
Diversification 6.61% 9.12% –2.51% –643.89
Table 8. Average POIC, WACC, ROIC – WACC and EVA of SOEs and POEs during the period 2006–2012
ROIC WACC ROIC – WACC EVA (million RMB)
SOE 4.37% 9.19% –4.82% –907.16
POE 6.79% 7.50% –0.71% –546.07
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much higher EVA than SOEs. The reason behind 
this can be explained by the following.
Sheltered by favorable regime and ambiguous 
relationship with state banks, senior executives of 
SOEs tend to have lower incentive to maximize 
shareholders’ return. It is revealed by the land 
records in Beijing that 82% of land auctions last 
year was won by SOEs, up from 59% in 2008. A 
recent report issued by the national Bureau of 
Economic Research in Cambridge also found that 
state-owned developers paid 27% more than their 
competitors from private sectors for a comparably 
equivalent piece of land on average (Bao, Chen 
2010). Aggressive land acquisition strategy backed 
up by state banks’ financing aid leads to higher 
capital employed and ignorance in economic inter-
est creation. In 2009, state-owned banks recorded 
$1.4 trillion loans, almost two times of the previ-
ous year. Analysts believe that a large portion of 
the money was flooded into the property market, 
resulting in the skyrocketing property prices. Over 
the past five years, various media have reported 
that SOEs outbid private property developers to 
win auctions in prime location and set new record 
for accommodation value, which is referred as 
“King of the land”. In addition, management and 
general staff in state-owned developers enjoy bet-
ter payment and welfare than their counterparts 
in the private sector if work load and others are 
equivalent (Tong, Huang 2012). The shareholders’ 
value are not so cared or enhanced owing to the 
causes listed above. On the contrary, the unfair 
competition that favors developers with state-
backed financing has forced private developers to 
focus more on investment efficiency in order to sur-
vive the crucial game. Therefore, POEs are more 
efficient than SOEs and hence enjoy a larger EVA.
Having explored the EVA difference between 
property-concentrated and multi-functional com-
panies, and between SOEs and POEs, we would 
like to test whether this difference is significant or 
not. We apply a heteroscedastic t-test to test the 
following hypotheses:
H1: The average EVA of multi-functional dur-
ing 2006–2012 is significantly larger than 
the average EVA of property-concentrated 
companies during 2006–2012.
H2: The average EVA of POEs during 2006–
2012 is significantly larger than the aver-
age EVA of SOEs during 2006–2012.
Tables 9 and 10 show the results performed by 
Excel.
To test the two hypotheses H1 and H2, we per-
form a one-tailed test. The p-values for one-tailed 
tests in both Tables 9 and 10 are greater than 
0.05, showing that at 5% significant level, both 
H1 and H2 are rejected, i.e. the average EVA of 
multi-functional during 2006–2012 is not signifi-
cantly larger than the average EVA of property-
concentrated companies during 2006–2012, while 
the average EVA of POEs during 2006–2012 is 
not significantly larger than the average EVA of 
SOEs during 2006–2012, too. The reason for this 
result can be explained by the following. A num-
ber of the selected multi-functional developers in-
volve in typical capital intensive industries, such 
as railway, telecommunication, mining, etc. All 
these industries require heavy capital investment 
in purchasing assets. The return rate is relatively 
lower compared with the total capital invested. 
Moreover, property focused developers have been 
able to accumulate substantial capital benefiting 
from economy of scale. Financial strengths of these 
companies enable them to involve in high-end de-
velopment and manage different projects at the 
same time thus generate higher operating profit. 
Table 9. Results of t-test between average EVA of 
property-concentrated and multi-functional companies 








Degrees of freedom 16
t-statistics –0.65970556
P-value (one-tailed test) 0.259413419
Critical value  
(one-tailed test)
1.745883669
P-value (two-tailed test) 0.518826837
Critical value (two-tailed 
test)
2.119905285
Table 10. Results of t-test between average EVA of 




no. of observations 12 6
Assumed mean difference 0
Degrees of freedom 14
t-statistics –1.0505
P-value (one-tailed test) 0.15564
Critical value (one-tailed test) 1.76131
P-value (two-tailed test) 0.31128
Critical value (two-tailed test) 2.14479
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This narrows the EVA gap between property-
concentrated and multifunctional companies and 
hence explains why the hypothesis H1 is rejected. 
The reason that H2 is rejected may be explained 
by the fact that SOEs are protected by the govern-
ment. They can obtain financial support from the 
government and state-owned banks. This lowers 
their risk and hence WACC. Thus the EVA gap 
between SOEs and POEs is narrowed.
6. IMPLICATIONS
The results in Section 5 show that the aver-
age EVA of the 18 selected mainland property 
companies remained negative during the period 
2006–2012. One of the main reasons for this re-
sult is related to the nature of property business. 
By Hui et al. (2007), it takes a much longer time 
for property companies to realize income from real 
estate projects. Capital expenses are incurred at 
the beginning, but revenue will only be collected 
through sales and rental income when the project 
is completed. As a result of such non-synchroni-
zation, although the project itself is profitable to 
the company in the long run, negative outcomes 
would occur in the beginning stages of the project 
from an accounting perspective. Therefore, the real 
implication of the negative EVA of the property 
companies is that the companies are, in fact, un-
dertaking long-term projects which will generate 
income only in the long run. The increase in total 
invested capital (IC) as mentioned in Section 5 in-
dicates that the companies are investing more and 
more on those projects. Hence their EVA became 
even more negative in 2011 and 2012.
Another reason for the result of negative EVA 
of the mainland property companies is that capital 
profit has not been taken into account in NOPAT, 
leading to understatement of the actual perfor-
mance of property, both as an investment asset 
and as a business unit (Ooi, Liow 2002). From 
Figure 3, the Second-hand House Price Index in 
Shanghai rose from about 1600 in 2006 to about 
2600 in 2012, yielding an annual increase of about 
8% over the period, which is sufficient to bridge 
the 3.45% gap between ROIC and WACC (see Ta-
ble 6). By Ooi and Liow (2002), NOPAT should in-
clude all valuation adjustments which affect the 
balance sheet in order to reflect the true perfor-
mance of property companies and real estate as an 
investment. Recognition of unrealized capital ap-
preciation as earnings would mitigate the illusion 
that property investment destroys value. Further-
more, according to De Villiers (1997), EVA, which 
is based on accounting profit (a poor proxy for 
economic profit), is distorted by inflation. In par-
ticular, he demonstrated that under inflation, for 
a firm holding non-depreciable fixed assets with 
a project duration of, say, four years, the EVA of 
the firm is understated. De Villiers (1997) derived 
the adjusted EVA (AEVA), which provides a better 
estimate of actual profitability under inflation, as 
an alternative performance measurement tool for 
companies.




Our results also show that multi-functional 
companies diversifying their businesses enjoyed a 
higher EVA than those concentrating their busi-
nesses on property (see Table 7). This is because 
the majority of the businesses those multi-func-
tional companies diversifying in do not have such 
a long period of time of realization of income as 
real estate projects do (as explained earlier in this 
section). The companies earn a higher EVA from 
those businesses and hence their overall EVA is 
also higher.
Another important result in this study is that 
POEs earned a much higher EVA than SOEs did 
(see Table 8). This reflects the inefficiency of SOEs. 
Although they are protected by the government 
and can obtain financial support from the govern-
ment and state-owned banks, the management of 
SOEs is often inefficient due to large size and bu-
reaucracy. Moreover, SOEs have a lower incentive 
to increase shareholders’ value because they are 
protected by the government and face little compe-
tition. This explains why POEs outperform SOEs 
in terms of EVA as shown in our results. By letting 
SOEs go private, the market force and external 
competition will force the companies to maximize 
shareholders’ value. Furthermore, management 
efficiency can be improved. In fact, as a policy of 
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opening the market, the Chinese government has 
continued to let some SOEs to go private in recent 
years. As a result, the market share of SOEs has 
shrunk steadily over the past decade. This trend of 
privatization of SOEs will continue in the future.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In order to bridge the gap of insufficient previous 
work on similar topics, this study investigates EVA 
of 18 mainland property companies from 2006 to 
2012. The following are the main results:
1. On average, the companies recorded a nega-
tive EVA over the period.
2. Multi-functional companies outperformed 
companies concentrating on property in 
terms of EVA.
3. POEs outperformed SOEs in terms of EVA.
Despite China’s strong economic growth in 
recent years, we find that the major mainland 
property companies experienced a negative EVA 
throughout the period 2006–2012. However, this 
does not mean that the companies were really per-
forming poorly during the period. As explained in 
Section 6, this result is due to the companies un-
dertaking long-term projects, and the companies 
do not recognize capital gain from property appre-
ciation as income. Hence the EVA of the companies 
may be understated. Therefore, investors should 
not rely solely on EVA of the companies. Instead, 
they should understand the nature of businesses 
of the companies thoroughly.
China is still in a transition from planned econ-
omy to market economy. The behavior of Chinese 
companies is different from that of companies in 
developed countries with free markets. For exam-
ple, SOEs (a particular type of business found in 
planned economies only) are found to be outper-
formed by POEs in terms of EVA in this research. 
Thus this study bridges the gap that EVA of Chi-
nese companies were seldom investigated in pre-
vious work. Investors investing in those emerging 
countries of which the market is not totally free 
like China should investigate thoroughly into the 
market characteristics of those countries. Past ex-
perience from developed countries may not be ap-
plicable to those emerging countries. This study 
can act as a reference for future studies in EVA of 
property companies in other emerging economies 
in the world.
This research has some limitations. Firstly, due 
to the criteria set in Section 4, only 18 companies 
are chosen. The performance of the companies not 
selected in this paper can be further investigated 
in the future. Secondly, as explained by De Vil-
liers (1997), EVA is distorted by inflation. Instead, 
AEVA should be used in order to remove the bias of 
EVA under inflation. The AEVA of mainland prop-
erty companies may be more reliable than their 
EVA, and is a useful scope for future research. 
Furthermore, companies listed in mainland use 
different accounting standards from those listed 
in Hong Kong. This would affect our results. nev-
ertheless, our study still provides a valuable first 
insight into the performance of major mainland 
property companies in terms of EVA.
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